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I. INTRODUCTION
A news reporter interviews a political science professor to obtain
information on international conflicts. The professor answers all of
the reporter's questions, asking only that he be quoted accurately and
fairly. When the article appears in print, the professor discovers that
he received no credit for his verbatim statements. Infuriated, the pro-
fessor confronts the reporter, who blames the error on sloppy editing
and poor proofreading. The frustrated professor seeks legal recourse
against the newspaper.
Historically, courts provided few remedies to interviewees whose
statements were wrongly used by interviewers.1 Despite some sugges-
* This article received first place in the Nebraska division of the 1988 Nathan
Burkan Memorial Competition, sponsored by the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1. Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l, 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981).
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tions that copyright protection was available for oral statements made
in interviews,2 courts consistently refused to recognize copyright in
conversations. However, the potential for successful copyright of oral
statements exists.3 Some commentators, and the Office of Copyright,
indicate that interviews should be protected by a "dual" copyright.4
Under the dual theory, both the interviewer and the interviewee can
claim copyright in their respective expressions, absent an agreement
to the contrary.
Similar to the hypothetical involving the political science profes-
sor, interviewees whose oral statements were wrongly used can seek
legal redress. This Comment examines the legal rights of interview-
ees who want to protect their oral statements. First, the Comment
discusses fixation, which separates common law copyright claims from
statutory copyright claims. Second, the Comment explores common
law claims available for unfixed works. Third, the Comment exam-
ines protection of fixed interviews under the Copyright Act of 19765
(the "Act"). Finally, the Comment further divides statutory protec-
tion, evaluating permissible use of quotations by interviewers and by
third parties.
II. FIXATION
Fixation determines whether federal statutory6 or common law
copyright applies. Common law and state statutes protect interviews
that are not "fixed in a tangible medium of expression."7 In contrast,
federal law protects "fixed" works. Examples of unfixed works in-
clude "an extemporaneous speech, 'original works of authorship' com-
municated solely through conversations or live broadcasts, and a
dramatic sketch or musical composition improvised or developed from
memory and without being recorded or written down."8 States can
protect unfixed works through common law or state statutes.
A. Factors Determining Fixation
Because fixation determines whether federal or common law ap-
2. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1969).
3. See A. LAyMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAw 115 n.3 (6th ed. 1986). See 1 M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02 (rev. ed. 1987).
4. COMPENDIUM II OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRAcTICEs § 317 (1984) [hereinafter COM-
PENDIUM II].
5. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Statutory protection requires a "work of authorship"
that is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped." For purposes of this Comment, we will assume that the article containing
the interview meets the "work of authorship" requirement.
7. Id. § 301(a), (b)(1).
8. H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1976) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
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plies, the factors constituting fixed works are critical. Fixed works
must be contained "in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device."9 Federal statutes and the United States Constitutiono re-
quire that fixation be in a tangible form.
The 1976 Act states that a work meets the fixation requirement
when it is "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration.""1 The work need not be written-merely
"sufficiently permanent" to permit reproduction. Thus, works embod-
ied in a copy or phonorecord meet the fixation requirement if they are
preserved by or under the authority of the author.12
The "sufficiently permanent" requirement creates problems for
live radio and television broadcasts, which are not technically "fixed"
under the Act. Congress, however, provided that simultaneously re-
corded live broadcasts should be protected the same as previously re-
corded broadcasts.13 Because broadcasters commonly record live
programs, broadcasters meet the stability requirement for virtually all
programs.14
The legislative history for the Act indicates that Congress wanted
to avoid artificial distinctions based on the medium used to express the
work.'s The Act places no emphasis on a work's form, manner, or
medium of fixation. A work may be expressed in words, numbers,
notes, sounds, pictures or by any other machine or device now known
or later developed.' 6
The Act also requires that a fixed work be preserved "by or under
the authority of the author."1 7 The authority question is crucial to
works consisting of interviews. Typically, the interviewee consents to
use of the interview. However, the oral statements of interviewees
may be captured on concealed tape recorders or other devices, without
the authority of the author. In theory, oral statements taped without
the interviewee's knowledge or authority are unfixed. The courts,
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
10. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8; see 1 M. NInER, supra note 3, § 2.03 (B). If a work is
not in tangible form, it does not qualify as a "writing" under the constitutional
clause authorizing copyright.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 1 M. NIM=E, supra note 3, § 2.03 (B)(2).
15. See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 52; White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (19O)(piano roll was not a "copy" of musical composition
recorded on the roll).
16. See HoUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 52.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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however, rarely address the authority distinction, so the importance of
the issue is unclear.
Under the Act, Congress specifically excluded transient works,
which cannot be reproduced, from the list of fixed works.18 Transient
works include images projected briefly on a television screen without
simultaneous recording, or material captured momentarily on a com-
puter screen. However, an interviewer could fix a transient computer
work simply by saving the material on a computer disk.
B. Application
To determine whether an interview has been "fixed," the inter-
viewee first must consider the method used to preserve the conversa-
tion. Journalists generally use one of four methods to preserve oral
statements. 19 First, a reporter may record the interview on either au-
dio or video tape. Second, the journalist may preserve the interview in
shorthand. Third, the reporter may take random notes of the oral
statements. Fourth, some journalists, who conduct interviews by tele-
phone, may type quotations directly into a computer.
The first method of preserving interviews, audio or video tape, gen-
erally provides a fixed, verbatim account of the conversation. The in-
terview meets the stability requirement because the tape can be
reproduced "with the aid of a machine."20 The taped interview also
meets the authority requirement as long as the interview'was con-
ducted by or under the authority of the author.21 However, if the in-
terviewee had no knowledge of and did not authorize the recording,
the taped interview is not fixed.
The second mode of interviewing, shorthand, also produces a ver-
batim record of the interview. The shorthand interview meets the sta-
bility requirement because the work can be reproduced simply by
reading the shorthand. The shorthand interview also meets the au-
thority requirement if the shorthand account was authorized by the
interviewee. An interviewee who is aware of the shorthand recording
probably has authorized the fixation under an implied consent theory.
Thus, if the interviewee agrees to or knows of the recording, the short-
hand interview probably is fixed under statutory copyright.
The most common journalistic method of preserving interviews is
the random notetaking method. Fixation in the random-note situa-
tion often depends on the thoroughness of the notes. 22 Theoretically,
only the portions of the interview preserved verbatim, by the author-
18. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 53.
19. Comment, Copyrighting Conversations: Applying the 1976 Copyright Act to In-
terviews, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 1071 (1982).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
21. Id.
22. See Comment, supra note 19, at 1076.
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ity of the author, are fixed. If the interviewer records only key words
without a verbatim transcript, the interview is not fixed.23
Under the random-note method, the interviewer basically recre-
ates the conversation in his own words. However, the interviewee can
claim fixation of direct quotations if the interviewee authorized the
recording of the verbatim quotes. In contrast, when material has been
paraphrased and no transcript of the interview exists, the interviewer
has not "fixed" the quotations within the meaning of the 1976 Act.
Thus, in most cases, except possibly for direct quotations, the inter-
viewee's contribution to a random-note interview is an unfixed work,
and therefore protected only by common law.
Finally, some journalists who conduct telephone interviews pre-
serve the interviewee's oral statements by typing quotations directly
into a computer. As in the random note situation, courts first consider
whether the interviewer recorded verbatim or paraphrased the state-
ments. If the interviewer paraphrased, the interviewer has a statutory
copyright claim in the fixed re-creation of the conversation. However,
the work must be saved on a computer disk to overcome the transient
duration problem.
In contrast, the interviewee would have a statutory copyright claim
for fixed statements and a common law copyright claim for unfixed
statements. Fixed quotations must be recorded verbatim on the com-
puter screen under the authority of the interviewee. In addition, the
verbatim statements must be filed on a computer disk or preserved in
some method capable of reproduction. To claim copyright in para-
phrased, unfixed statements the interviewee must rely on common
law or state statutes.
In sum, fixation determines whether common law or federal statu-
tory law protects an interviewee's right to quotations. Federal statu-
tory copyright 24 protects only fixed works, while common law or state
statutes protect unfixed works. Interviews recorded on audio or video
tape generally qualify as fixed works. Shorthand interviews are fixed,
when authorized by the interviewee. In contrast, interviews pre-
served through random notetaking probably are unfixed and would
qualify only for common law protection. However, direct quotations
within the random-note interview arguably are fixed if they are pre-
served by the authority of the author and can be reproduced.
III. COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Common law copyright protects unfixed works such as conversa-
tions or improvised live broadcasts.25 Only one state, California, ex-
23. Id.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
25. See HoUSE REPORT, supm note 8, at 13L
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pressly protects unfixed works of authorship. 26 In contrast, New
Jersey requires that works be fixed in writing or some other tangible
form to be protected by common law copyright.27 The New Jersey
scheme, in effect, eliminates common law copyright because fixed
works are protected only by statutory copyright. Under New Jersey
law, no common law protection would be available for oral statements.
Other states have left the issue of common law copyright protection
for oral statements to the courts, but courts have failed to decide the
issue.28
In Estate of Hemingway v. Random House,29 the estate of Ernest
Hemingway sued the author and publisher of the book PAPA HEMING-
WAY. The young author, A.E. Hotchner, was Hemingway's friend and
drinking companion. In his book, Hotchner included numerous quota-
tions from his discussions with Hemingway. The court addressed
whether the conversations between the famed Hemingway and the
relatively unknown Hotchner could be protected by common law
copyright, although Hemingway himself had not reduced the words to
writing.
The court suggested that, in some limited and special situations, if
both parties understand oral statements to be the unique intellectual
product of the principal speaker, the work could qualify for common
law copyright protection provided the statements were in writing.
However, the court required that the speaker "indicate that he in-
tended to mark off the utterance in question from the ordinary stream
of speech, that he meant to adopt it as a unique statement and that he
wished to exercise control over its publication." 3 0 In Hemingway, the
court stated that Hemingway's words and conduct made it clear that
he was willing to let Hotchner use the conversations in writing and to
publish excerpts from the conversations. Thus, the court dismissed
the case because the defendant had Hemingway's consent.
Copyright commentators criticized Hemingway because the court
advocated stricter requirements for copyright of oral statements than
for written statements.3 ' For example, the court held that speakers
must show a "unique intellectual product" and some "indication" that
they planned to claim copyright in the words. Nimmer criticized the
"unique intellectual product" standard because it requires some nov-
elty or creativity for oral statements that is not necessary for copy-
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 (a)(1) (West 1988).
27. Rowe v. Golden W. Television Prods., 184 N.J. Super. 264, 445 A.2d 1165 (1982),
cert denied, 91 N.J. 241, 450 A.2d 562 (1982) (citing Aronson v. Baker, 43 N.J. Eq.
365, 12 A. 177 (Ch. 1887)).
28. Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l, 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981); Estate of Heming-
way v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1969).
29. 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1969).
30. Id. at 349, 244 N.E.2d at 258, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
31. 1 M. NmcIMER, supra note 3, § 2.02.
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right protection of written statements. 32 Similarly, the court's
"indication" standard requires notice not needed for written copyright
protection.3 3 Courts also would have difficulty determining the meth-
ods permissible to indicate that the speaker intended to claim copy-
right. Thus, Hemingway provides little guidance for determining
common law copyright in oral works.
Under the fixation analysis of the 1976 Act, some of the works in
Hemingway would have been fixed and arguably eligible for statutory
copyright protection. Hotchner tape recorded several of his conversa-
tions with Hemingway. In the taped interviews, the stability require-
ment was met because the tape recording can be reproduced. In
addition, the authority requirement was met because Hemingway
agreed to let Hotchner tape record the conversations. Thus, the taped
conversations were fixed.
Hotchner also preserved some conversations through notes. The
fixation of the conversations would depend on the extensiveness of
the notetaking. If Hotchner merely paraphrased or preserved key
words, Hemingway's quotations were not fixed. If, however, Hotchner
recorded the quotations verbatim, the statements would have been
fixed, provided the stability and authorization requirements were met.
Thus, under the 1976 Act, some of Hemingway's statements could
have been fixed through Hotchner's notetaking and eligible for statu-
tory copyright protection.
Common law copyright of oral statements also was considered in
Falwell v. Penthouse International.34 The Reverend Jerry Falwell
consented to an interview with two freelance journalists. The journal-
ists sold the interview to Penthouse Magazine. Falwell sued, claiming
the interview appeared in Penthouse without his consent and contrary
to oral conditions given at the time of the interview.35
The court rejected Falwell's claim that he should have a common
law copyright in his oral statements. Noting that Falwell was a public
figure, the court stated:
Plaintiff cannot seriously contend that each of his responses in the published
interview setting forth his ideas and opinions is a product of his intellectual
labors which should be recognized as a literary or even intellectual creation.
There is nothing concrete which distinguishes his particular expression of his
ideas from the ordinary.
3 6
The court relied on Falwell's consent to the interview to justify the
32. Id.
33. However, the indication requirement is somewhat analogous to the copyright no-
tice for published works. Works published in visually perceptible copies may con-
tain a notice that includes the year of first publication. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (a), (b)
(1982).
34. 521 F. Supp. 1204 (WMD. Va. 1981).
35. Id. at 1208.
36. Id.
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dismissal of the case.3 7 However, the reliance on consent might be
misplaced if Falwell actually had placed conditions on the use of the
interview.
Nimmer again criticized the court's decision because it advocated a
"literary" content test not required in statutory copyright.38 If
Falwell had written his statements, rather than spoken them, the
statements would have been protected. Thus, the "literary" distinc-
tion seems irrelevant.3 9
Finally, Falwell noted the potential to open the floodgates of litiga-
tion, allowing hundreds of claims from celebrities and public figures
who are regularly interviewed by the media.40 The flood gate argu-
ment is unconvincing. Litigation costs simply are too high for public
figures to bring lawsuits for minor reporting errors. Further, most ce-
lebrities and public figures probably would not object to brief, fair use
of their quotations.41
Despite the court's negative attitude toward protection of oral
statements, Falwell suggests that, in rare circumstances, "a cause of
action involving an oral expression can be sustained under a common
law copyright theory."42 However, the court failed to elaborate on the
narrow circumstances when oral statements could be protected. Thus,
the court only invites conjecture of what circumstances will give rise
to common law copyright protection.
Hemingway and Falwell failed to reach firm conclusions about
common law copyright of oral statements. The courts looked at fac-
tors such as consent of the party interviewed, the uniqueness of the
statements, indications that the speaker intended to claim copyright,
and the potential for increased litigation. Hemingway and Falwell did
not expressly recognize common law copyright of oral statements, nor
did they preclude the possibility of such claims in the future. Heming-
way and Falwell indicate that the possibility of a common law copy-
right in oral statements still exists. Realistically, however, at the
present time interviewees probably could not retain control of their
statements through common law copyright claims.
In most interview situations, the interviewee has consented to the
use of the quotations. Courts place great emphasis on an interviewee's
consent to use of the statements. However, an exception could be de-
veloped for statements made "off the record."43
37. Id.
38. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.02.
39. Id.
40. Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l, 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (W.D. Va. 1981).
41. 1 M. NimmmE, supra note 3, § 2.02 n.37.1.
42. Falwel v. Penthouse Int'l, 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1208 (W.D. Va. 1981).
43. Off-the-record statements go beyond the scope of consent. Interviewers do not
have permission to use off-the-record statements because the interviewee has not
consented to the use.
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Hemingway and Falwell also require proof of "literary" content in
the oral statements. Statutory copyright does not require a showing
of "literary" content. Hemingway also stated that a speaker must "in-
dicate" his intent to claim copyright in oral statements. The indication
requirement unfairly forces a speaker to give notice that is unneces-
sary in most statutory copyright claims, although some notice is re-
quired for statutory protection of published works.
As mentioned earlier in the discussion on fixation,44 only unfixed
works (such as random-note interviews) would qualify for common
law copyright protection. The feasibility of a common law copyright
in quotations based on random-note interviews is questionable. First,
the interviewee must overcome the consent defense. The interviewee
must show that the statements were recorded without his knowledge
or that he placed special conditions on the use of the statements.
More importantly, the random-note interview generally fails to es-
tablish the Hemingway "indication" and "literary" requirements. If
only random notes of the interview exist, the interviewee probably
cannot prove that he indicated an intention to copyright his state-
ments. Further, the interviewee must prove that his statements were
"literary," and more than general, abstract ideas. The Hemingway
standards are difficult to meet when no verbatim transcript of the in-
terview exists.
Nimmer reveals a somewhat brighter picture for common law
copyright of oral statements.4 5 Nimmer states that as tape recording
and other electronic devices become more popular, the need for com-
mon law copyright will increase. Nimmer's premise carries little
weight when one considers fixation. In most cases, an interview pre-
served by video or audio tape will be considered fixed, unless the tape
was made without the authority of the author. Thus, in the majority
of cases, only non-verbatim portions of the random-note interview will
qualify as unfixed.
In sum, interviewees probably have little chance to bring success-
ful claims for common law copyright of oral statements. The key issue
will be fixation. Although Hemingway and Falwell do not exclude the
possibility of common law protection for interviews, both cases pro-
vide little, if any, guidance for bringing a successful lawsuit.
IV. STATUTORY COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
If a work is fixed, the 1976 Act expressly preempts all state statu-
44. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
45. 1 MVL NIMlu, supra note 3, § 2.02. See Dunlap, Copyright Protection for Oral
Works-Expansion of the Copyright Law into the Area of Conversations, 20 Bull.
Copyright Soc'y 285 (1973).
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tory and common law copyright claims.46 When analyzing statutory
copyright claims, courts first must determine whether the work is
fixed. Second, courts must determine who owns the copyright in the
work. Third, courts must consider permissible use of quotations,
drawing distinctions between use by the interviewer and use by a third
party.
A. Interview Ownership
When dealing with statutory copyright, courts have split on the is-
sue of interview ownership. Some courts advocate interviewer own-
ership of the copyright.47 Others maintain that the interviewer and
the interviewee separately own their respective contributions, unless
otherwise agreed.46 Generally, the court's view of ownership deter-
mines the degree of copyright protection available.
1. The Interviewer
Several courts maintain that the interviewer is the sole owner of a
work consisting of quotations. The courts reason that the interviewer
recreates the conversation, organizes the article and forms the literary
expression.49
In Harris v. Miller,50 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's play
infringed on a copyrighted biography of Oscar Wilde. The court found
that the defendant's taking of quotations was substantial, and that use
of quotation marks did not put the words in the public domain. Fur-
ther, no stenographer recorded the conversations used in the biogra-
phy. Therefore, the reconstruction of the conversations was the
literary effort of the interviewer.
Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House5, also emphasized the in-
terviewer's ownership in the work. In its suit, Rosemont Enterprises
alleged that a Random House biography on Howard Hughes infringed
on copyrighted articles about the eccentric billionaire. The district
court rejected Random House's fair use defense because of the com-
46. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
47. Quinto v. Legal Times, 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1981); Rosemont Enters. v. Ran-
dom House, 256 F. Supp. 55, 61 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 366 F.2d 303
(2d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Harris v. Miller, 50 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
48. COMPENDIUM II, supra note 4, § 317.
49. Quinto v. Legal Times, 506 F. Supp. 554, 559 (D.D.C. 1981); Rosemont Enters. v.
Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 366 F.2d
303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Harris v. Miller, 50 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
50. 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
51. 256 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
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mercial gain involved.52 However, the court of appeals reversed, stat-
ing that Rosemont failed to show the infringement had lessened the
value of the articles.
Similarly, in Quinto v. Legal Times,5 3 the court upheld the inter-
viewer's ownership in the copyright in the compilation of the inter-
viewee's quotations. However, Quinto did not deny that interviewees
could claim ownership of their statements. In Quinto, the defendant,
The Legal Times, reprinted verbatim an article written by the plain-
tiff for the Harvard Law Record. The defendant argued the inter-
viewer did not own copyright in the quotations. The court rejected the
claim, stating that even if the plaintiff did not own copyright to the
quotations, he had permission to use the material and a copyright in
the compilation.5 4
Thus, some courts maintain that the interviewer owns copyright in
the interview. Factors leading to interviewer ownership include a re-
creation of the conversation by the interviewer, the consent of the in-
terviewee,55 and the lack of an actual transcript of the interview. In
applying the criteria to interviews, courts most likely would conclude
that the interviewer owns the copyright in the work if no verbatim
quotations were recorded. If the quotations were not recorded, the
interviewer probably re-created the statements in his own expression.
The interviewee then would have no statutory claim for copyright
ownership in the quotations.
2. The Dual Approach
The Copyright Office takes the position that separate copyrights
exist in works derived from an interview.5 6 Commentators agree that
interviews should be considered two separable works.5 7 Under the
dual copyright theory, the interviewer and the interviewee have own-
ership of their respective contributions, absent an agreement to the
contrary.58
Each has the right to claim copyright in his or her own expression in the ab-
sence of an agreement to the contrary. Where an application for such a work
names only the interviewee or the interviewer as the author and claimant, and
where the nature of authorship is described as 'entire text,' it is unclear
whether the claim actually extends to the entire work, or only to the text by
the interviewee or interviewer. In any case where the extent of the claim is
not clear, the Copyright Office must communicate with the applicant for
52. Id. at 66.
53. 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1981).
54. Id. at 559.
55. The consent issue is important because courts could view consent as a transfer of
any ownership rights the interviewee may have.
56. See COMPENDIUM I1, supra note 4, § 317.
57. See A. LATMAN, supra note 3, at 115; 1 M. NIMnnR, supra note 3, § 2.02.
58. See COMPENDIUM II, supra note 4, § 317.
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clarification. 5 9
The dual approach to copyright of interviews is the better reasoned
approach because both interests merit protection. Interviewers should
have copyright in the compilation and organization of their articles,
but interviewees deserve a copyright in their verbatim quotations.
Problems arise under the dual approach if the parties cannot agree on
their respective contributions. Despite some difficulties, the dual ap-
proach usually gives both parties credit for their respective works.
Thus, the dual theory allows interviewees to protect their quotations
from wrongful use by interviewers or by third parties.
B. Use by the Interviewer
Courts seldom address the issue of wrongful use of quotations by
an interviewer. Most cases involve the wrongful use of quotations by
third parties, who take material without authorization from the inter-
viewer or interviewee.6 0 However, as the dual theory of interview
ownership becomes more prevalent, the number of cases involving
wrongful use by an interviewer likely will increase.
Recently, in Phillips v. INC Magazine,6 1 the court discussed the
improper use of quotations by an interviewer. In Phillips, the plaintiff
was a domestic relations lawyer. A writer for INC Magazine inter-
viewed the plaintiff by telephone for comments on divorce in the busi-
ness world. The lawyer agreed to the interview, provided she was
quoted accurately and given attribution for her quotations.
Upon publication of the story in INC Magazine, the plaintiff found
that two paragraphs of her original verbatim statements were not at-
tributed. The plaintiff registered the two paragraphs with the United
States Copyright Office and filed suit for copyright infringement.
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim, stating that the plaintiff
failed to "fix" a "work of authorship" in any "tangible medium of ex-
pression" under federal law.6 2 "More specifically, the plaintiff does
not allege that the ideas transferred by her over the telephone to the
defendant were embodied in a copy or phonorecord and therefore,
were fixed at the time of transfer."63 Thus, the case was dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
However, the court did not completely preclude the possibility of
bringing a successful statutory case. In footnote one,64 the court noted
59. Id.
60. For a discussion on wrongful use by third parties, see infra notes 88-109 and ac-
companying text.
61. No. 86-5514 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 1987)(Westlaw, DCT database).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
63. Phillips v. INC Magazine, No. 86-5514 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 1987)(Westlaw, DCT
database).
64. Id. at n.1.
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that if the ideas became fixed when printed in INC Magazine and then
were used by the defendant, an infringement may have occurred.
"Plaintiff, however, has not alleged any use of these statements other
than the original printing in INC."r-5
The language of footnote one implies that the court considered the
article an "authorized" fixation. The court's reasoning probably
would result in a "one-shot" rule for interviews. The interviewer
would have the right to use the interviewee's statements for one arti-
cle. If the statements are used in subsequent articles, then the inter-
viewee could claim infringement.
The court's analysis, however, is flawed. The court failed to con-
sider that the interviewee's statements could be fixed during the ini-
tial interview. An infringement claim depends upon the method used
to preserve the interview. In Phillips, the interview was conducted by
telephone. The reporter may have recorded the statements on tape
(through a telephone recording device), in shorthand, in random notes
or on a computer. As discussed earlier, fixation would depend on
whether the statements were recorded verbatim, under the authority
of the interviewee and in a method capable of reproduction. If the
interviewee's statements became fixed during the initial interview,
then infringement occurred if the interviewer used the fixation in pre-
paring the subsequent article. If the interviewer's use of the fixation
can be shown, then the interviewee has a claim for infringement.
The court also failed to address whether quotations consisting of a
single or a few sentences are too "small" to be copyrightable. No rules
specify the proper length of a work of authorship.6 6 Thus, the brevity
of a quotation is not necessarily a defense to copyright infringement.
Interviewers, however, may be protected by other factors, such as the
interviewee's consent to the use or the fair use doctrine.
When an interviewee consents to use of quotations, courts gener-
ally indicate that the interviewee cannot deny the interviewer use of
the statements. 67 However, if the interviewer's use of the quotation
goes beyond the interviewee's consent, the interviewer no longer is
protected. In Phillips, the interviewee consented to use of her quota-
tions as long as she was quoted accurately and she received credit for
her statements.6 8 When the interviewer failed to attribute the state-
ments to the interviewee, the consent defense no longer applied. Sim-
ilarly, consent would not protect interviewers who report quotations
65. Id.
66. See COMPENDIUM II, suprm note 4, § 202.02 (1). However, the Copyright Office
states that words and short phrases such as names, titles and slogans are not copy-
rightable. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (a) (1987).
67. 1 M. NnMim, supra note 3, § 2.02.
68. Phillips v. INC Magazine, No. 86-5514 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 1987) (Westlaw, DCT
database).
19881
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
incorrectly, use off-the-record statements, or bypass the interviewee's
consent in another manner. In sum, the interviewee's consent to use
of quotations protects the interviewer from infringement claims, un-
less the use goes beyond the interviewee's consent.
Fair use also can serve as a defense to the interviewer's use of quo-
tations.69 Although no courts have considered fair use by an inter-
viewer, Nimmer states that fair use could be a valid defense in such a
situation.70 The fair use doctrine7 ' was intended to permit "courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."72
The doctrine establishes four factors which courts must consider when
analyzing fair use claims.73 However, these factors are not exclusive.
Courts may consider other factors as well. The doctrine also fails to
specify how much weight should be given to each factor.74 Thus, fair
use is largely a mixture of law and fact, unique to each case.
1. Purpose and Character
In the preamble to the fair use doctrine, Congress stated that some
uses, such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship
and research,75 are most appropriate for finding fair use. However,
courts continually have found that appropriate uses, such as news re-
porting, do not guarantee a finding of a fair use.7 6 Other factors also
must be considered, such as the commercial nature of the use,7 7 the
propriety of the defendant's conduct, and any errors in the use.78
In interview cases, courts would be more inclined to find fair use if
69. 1 M. NmwmR, supra note 3, § 2.02.
70. Id.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
72. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
73. In determining whether the use made of a work is a fair use, the factors to be
considered include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1) (1982). See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 44849 (1984); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (2d Cir.
1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987).
78. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260-61 (2d Cir. 1986), cert
denied, 107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987); Meeropal v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061,1071 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
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the quotation was used for news reporting, criticism, comment or re-
search. Because most interviewees consent to use of their quota-
tions,7 9 fair use claims generally would involve interviewers who have
exceeded the scope of interviewees' consent. To exceed consent, an
interviewer generally must make substantial errors in the inter-
viewee's quotations or ignore the interviewee's conditions. When the
interviewer's purpose is comment or criticism, rather than commercial
gain,8 0 courts probably will not deiy fair use unless the interviewer's
conduct is blatant and purposeful.S'
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor of the fair use defense, nature of the copyrighted
work, analyzes factors such as whether the infringed work was pub-
lished or unpublished. Courts generally agree that the scope of fair
use is narrower with respect to unpublished works.8 2
In an interview, the speaker's quotations are not published. Thus,
the interviewer has less fair use protection than would be available for
published works. Some courts indicate that less material may be cop-
ied from unpublished works than from published works under the fair
use doctrine.8 3 As a result, interviewees should have claims against
interviewers who use a few quotations from an unpublished work
without the interviewees' consent.
3. Amount and Substantiality
When evaluating the amount and substantiality of the portion
used, courts continually look to the quality of the work used, not the
quantity.8 4 In addition, courts examine the form of expression used by
the alleged infringer.85
Applying the cited principles to interviews, courts again focus on
the individual facts of each case. If, for example, the reporter used
79. See supra text accompanying note 43.
80. Some interviewers use inflammatory quotations to increase sales of newspapers
and magazines.
81. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260-1261 (2d Cir. 1986), cert de-
nied, 107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987). Noting the "comment" and "criticism" use of the
work, the court refused to place great weight on errors made in the use of the
statements. "Only where distortions were so deliberate, and so misrepresentative
of the original work that no reasonable person could find them to be the product
of mere carelessness would we incline toward rejecting a fair use claim."
82. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 213
(1987).
83. Id. at 97.
84. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied,
107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987).
85. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct.
213 (1987).
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only a few quotations, but the statements were of high quality, courts
would weigh the factor heavily in favor of the interviewee. However,
the success of the interviewee's claim depends on the court's balance
of the quality, the quantity, and the expression of the statements
taken.
4. Effect on the Market
The Supreme Court considered the market factor to be most im-
portant in fair use determinations.8 6 To analyze market effects, courts
look not only to present markets, but also to potential markets which
interviewees might explore in the future.8 7
In cases involving wrongful use of quotations by interviewers,
courts generally weigh the market factor heavily in favor of interview-
ees.8 8 The interviewers' misuse of quotations diminish markets for
the interviewee because others will be less willing to buy rights to use
the quotations. If the court finds that interviewees have been hurt
financially by wrongful use of quotations, the court may reject the in-
terviewers' fair use defense. In sum, interviewees have potential
claims against interviewers for wrongful use of quotations. To suc-
ceed, interviewees first must overcome the issue of consent to the use
of the quotations. After resolving the consent issue, interviewees still
must surmount the fair use defense. Despite the consent and fair use
hurdles, interviewees should have successful claims against interview-
ers who infringe on their copyrightable quotations.
C. Use by Third Party
In addition to the interviewer's wrongful use of quotations, many
infringement cases involve wrongful use of quotations by third parties
without permission from interviewees or interviewers. Unlike inter-
viewers, third-party users generally cannot invoke the consent de-
fense.89 However, third-party users sometimes have a stronger fair
use defense, especially when the quotation has been published.
In third-party cases, courts focus on several factors, such as com-
mercial gain, errors, good faith, and comment or criticism by the third
party. The leading United States Supreme Court case involving fair
use by a third party is Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enter-
prises.90 In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court stated that news re-
86. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)(the market
factor "is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use").
87. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
213 (1987).
88. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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porting does not override copyright protections, especially where
commercial gain occurs.
Harper & Row involved a contract between former President Ger-
ald Ford and Harper & Row publishers to feature excerpts of Ford's
memoirs in Time Magazine. Before the excerpts were published, Na-
tion Magazine received copies of the memoirs from an unauthorized
source and printed several verbatim quotes. Time Magazine then re-
fused to publish the excerpts and cancelled the contract.
Rejecting a fair use claim, the Court emphasized Nation's commer-
cial purpose for printing the quotations. The commercial profit issue
depends on "whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price." 91 Further,
the court noted the lack of comment and criticism in the article.
Harper & Row, however, is easily distinguishable from the typical
interview situation. Many of the quotations taken from Ford's
memoirs were not derived from interviews. Some statements, such as
those from Alexander Haig, then-White House Chief of Staff, were
made years earlier in the course of Haig's duties. Ford apparently re-
created Haig's statements, based on his memory of the event. Thus,
Ford had strong claims for copyright in both his statements and in the
statements of others because Ford re-created and recorded his mem-
ory of the conversations with others.
Courts also consider whether errors were made in the use of a
work and whether the third-party user acted in good faith. In
Maxtone-Grahcm v. Burtchae ,92 a Catholic priest used quotations
from a 1973 pro-abortion book, which consisted of interviews with sev-
enteen women. The priest, who was also a professor of theology at the
University of Notre Dame, asked for permission to use the quotations
but was refused. The priest and his publisher included the quotations
in the book without permission,93 and the plaintiff filed suit.
The plaintiff interviewer claimed ownership in all of the quota-
tions because she had obtained copyright assignments from the inter-
viewees. However, the plaintiff failed to record the assignments with
the Copyright Office. The ownership issue was not addressed in the
opinion because the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment
based on the fair use defense.94
Noting the "comment" and "criticism" nature of the work, the
court refused to place great weight on errors made in the use of the
91. Id. at 568.
92. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 2201 (1987).
93. The priest considered paraphrasing the interviews, but felt that "it [was] essential
for the credibility of my essay that the words of abortion veterans themselves
appear." Id. at 1256.
94. Id. at 1255.
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statements.9 5 The court held: "Only where the distortions were so
deliberate, and so misrepresentative of the original work that no rea-
sonable person could find them to be the product of mere carelessness
would we incline toward rejecting a fair use claim."96
The court also refused to place great weight on the priest's ques-
tionable use of quotations after permission had been denied. Instead,
the court noted that the priest obtained the quotations through legiti-
mate channels and was willing to pay for use of the quotations.9 7
Finally, in examining the commercial motive of the priest, the
court noted that "[a]ll publications presumably are operated for
profit."98 The court reasoned that because of the small number of cop-
ies of the priest's book sold (about 6,000), the commercial use factor
should not weigh heavily on the fair use defense.99
Courts also consider the nature of the copyrighted work when de-
ciding the propriety of a third-party's use of quotations. Factors the
courts consider include whether the infringed work was published or
unpublished. The publication distinction plays a major role in cases
involving use by a third party. Courts generally agree that the fair use
defense is stronger when dealing with published works.100
In Salinger v. Random House,'O' the defendant wrote a biography
of novelist J.D. Salinger. Salinger refused to cooperate because he had
chosen to avoid all publicity and had stopped publishing. The defend-
ant's main source for the book were unpublished letters written by
Salinger between 1939 and 1961. Most of the letters were donated to
university libraries. Salinger sought an injunction barring publication
of the biography, which contained the author's copyrighted, unpub-
lished letters. Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals granted the injunction.
Following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Harper & Row,
the court placed "special emphasis on the unpublished nature of Salin-
ger's letters."' 02 The court noted two interpretations for the Supreme
Court's statement that the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to
unpublished works. The statement could indicate that copying is
more likely to be unfair when unpublished works are involved. Alter-
natively, the statement could imply that the amount of material that
may be copied under the fair use doctrine is less for unpublished
95. Id. at 1260-61.
96. Id. at 1260.
97. Id. at 1264.
98. Id. at 1262 (quoting Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1967)).
99. Id.
100. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
101. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 213
(1987).
102. Id. at 96.
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works than for published works. 03 The Salinger court concluded that
the scope of fair use is narrower when unpublished works are copied.
When evaluating the amount and substantiality of the portion used
by a third party, courts again focus on the quality of the work used,
rather than the quantity10 4 Factors considered include the number,
size and importance of the quotations used, and the justifications for
use of the passages.
In Craft v. Kobler,105 the plaintiff sought an injunction to stop pub-
lication of a biography of composer Igor Stravinsky. The biography,
"Firebird," contained extensive quotations from books written by the
plaintiff.106 The plaintiff, Craft, owned copyright in the quotations
because Stravinsky had willed Craft his copyright to the quotations.
Rejecting the defendant's fair use defense, the court granted a pre-
liminary injunction. The court concluded that "Firebird's appropria-
tions of copyrighted material are too extensive and important, and
their justification too slight to support an overall claim of fair use."107
Finally, courts place great weight on diminished markets resulting
from third-party infringement.108 To analyze the effect on the mar-
ket, courts look not only to present market factors, but also to poten-
tial markets the plaintiff might explore in the future.10 9
In the interview situation, improper use of quotations by a third
party could harm the interviewee in the future. Others might be un-
willing to pay the interviewee for quotations that already have ap-
peared without authorization in a third-party's work. As a result,
future markets diminish and the interviewee suffers because of the
third-party's infringement.
In sum, the interviewer's claim to prevent a third-party's use of
quotations will depend on the circumstances of the case. Courts first
will consider the commercial nature of the use, the propriety of the
third party's conduct, errors in the use, and other relevant factors.
Second, courts determine whether the quotations appeared in a pub-
lished work. Third, courts examine the quality and quantity of the
work taken. For example, in Craft, if Stravinsky had been alive and
had not assigned his copyright to Craft, then Stravinsky also could
have obtained an injunction to stop Kobler's use of the quotations. Fi-
nally, courts evaluate the effects of the third-party's use on commer-
103. Id. at 97.
104. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied,
107 S. Ct. 2201 (1987).
105. Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
106. The plaintiff, Craft, published four "conversation" books written in the form of
interviews of Stravinsky by Craft.
107. Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
108. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
109. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
213 (1987).
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cial markets. Interviewees' claims likely will succeed if the third
party derives commercial gain from the use and diminishes markets
for the interviewee.
V. CONCLUSION
Thorough analysis of copyright law indicates that interviewees
have a legal recourse for wrongful use of their quotations. If a quota-
tion is unfixed, common law protects the interviewee. If a quotation is
fixed, statutory law protects the interviewee.
Despite apparent legal remedies, courts refuse to recognize copy-
right protection of oral statements. Public policy supports and de-
mands that interviewees receive copyright protection for their
quotations. Claims for protection of oral statements would promote
more responsibility in the press. Reporters and editors would be ac-
countable for misuse of quotations and errors in quotations. Further,
protection of oral statements would enhance the free flow of informa-
tion. Interviewees would speak more freely, knowing they could
maintain some control over their statements.
Courts should acknowledge claims for copyright of oral statements.
Interviewees deserve legal channels to protect their quotations. Some
problems may arise when courts allow copyright of oral statements.
For example, interviewees may have difficulty proving the content of
their statements or proving that they did not consent to use of the
quotations. However, technological advances in newsgathering should
eliminate many of the problems. Each day hundreds of quotations are
preserved on audio tape, video tape and computers. The benefits of
copyright in quotations far outweigh the burdens.
Vicki L. Ruhga '89
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